One lesson of the financial crisis is this: when the entire financial system succumbs to panic, only the government is powerful enough to prevent a complete collapse. Panics signify the triumph of fear. Troubled Assets Relieve Program (TARP) was part of the process by which fear was overcome. It wasn’t the only part, but it was an essential part. Without TARP, we’d be worse off today. No one can say whether unemployment would be 11% or 14%; it certainly wouldn’t be 8.9%.
That benefited all Americans. TARP, says Douglas Elliott of the Brookings Institution, “is the best large federal program to be despised by the public.” The source of outrage is no secret. Bankers are blamed for the crisis and reviled. The bank bailout-TARP’s first and most important purpose-was unpopular. Most Americans, says Elliott, “believe that taxpayers spent $700 billion and got nothing in return.”
What this ignores is that an alternative being promoted at the time was widespread nationalization of banks. The cost would have been many times higher; the practical problems would have been enormous. As it was, TARP invested $245 billion in banks. The extra capital helped restore trust. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve increased its lending; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp, guaranteed $350 billion of bank borrowings. Banks resumed dealing with each other because they regained confidence that commitments would be honored. Of the $245 billion invested in banks, the Treasury has already recovered about $244 billion, including interest payments, dividends, and cash from sold bank stock warrants. So the bank rescue has roughly broken even. When TARP’S remaining bank investments are closed, the Treasury expects an overall profit of about $20 billion.
Almost all of TARP’S activities have been distasteful. This was surely true of the rescue of General Motors and Chrysler. But the automakers5 collapse would clearly have worsened already gloomy unemployment. Did we really want these companies to shut down, with some plants sold to foreign automakers? We need to remember that TARP was a desperate program for desperate times. But some criticisms are broad generalities that, on inspection, are highly suspect. One common assertion is that TARP will encourage more reckless risk-taking because big financial firms know they’ll be bailed out if their gambles backfire. Bankers keep profits but are protected against losses, which are assumed by the public.
This is a serious issue, but TARPS legacy is actually the opposite. During the crisis, investors in banks and financial institutions suffered huge losses. It wasn’t predictable which institutions would survive and which wouldn’t-or on what terms. The same would be true in the future. Indeed, TARP’S extreme unpopularity compounds uncertainty, because it suggests that politicians will recoil from more bailouts. The moral hazard is more imagined than real.
1. What do we learn about TARP from the first paragraph?
2. The primary purpose of launching TARP is to ______.
3. What did TARP’s $245 billion investment in banks bring about?
4. What’s the authors attitude towards the rescue of General Motors and Chrysler?
5. What does the author imply by saying “TARP’s extreme unpopularity compounds uncertainty” in the last paragraph?
