Many critics of the current welfare system argue that existing welfare regulations lead to family instability. They believe that those regulations, which exclude most poor husband-and-wife families from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) assistance grants, contribute to the problem of family dissolution. Thus, they conclude that expanding the set of families that can eligibly get such grants would result in a marked strengthening of the low-income family structure.
If all poor families could welfare, would the incidence of instability change markedly? The answer to this question depends on relative importance of three types of potential welfare recipients. The first is the "Cheater" -the husband who is reported to have abandoned his family, but in fact disappears only when the social worker is in the neighborhood. The second consists of a loving husband and devoted father who, sensing his own inadequacy as a family supporter, leaves so that his wife and children may enjoy the relative benefit provided by public assistance. There is very little evidence that these two types are significant
The third type is the unhappily married couple, who remain together out of a sense of economic responsibility for their children, because of the high costs of separation, or because of the consumption benefits of marriage. This group is large. The formation, maintenance, and dissolution of the family is in large pan a function of the relative balance between the benefits and costs of marriage as seen by the individual members of the marriage. Since the family performs certain functions society regards as vital, a complex network of social and legal process has evolved to reinforce marriage. Much of the variation in marital stability across income classes can be explained by the variation in costs of dissolution imposed by society, such as division of property, and child support.
Marital stability is related to the costs of achieving an acceptable agreement on family consumption and production and to the prevailing social price of instability in the marriage social-economic group. Expected income exerts pressures air family instability by reducing the cost of dissolution .To the extent that welfare is a form of government-subsidized AFDC payments, it reduces the costs of separation and guarantees a minimal standard of living for wife and children. So welfare opportunities are a significant determinant of family instability in poor neighborhoods, but this is not the result of AFDC regulations that exclude most intact families from coverage. Rather, welfare-related instability occurs because public assistance lowers both the benefits of marriage and the costs of its breach by providing a system of government-subsidized payments.
1.Which of the following best summarizes the main idea of the passage?
2.The tone of the passage can best be described as（ ）.
3.With which of the following statements about marriage would the author most likely agree?
4.The passage would most likely be found in a（ ）.
